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"A TROUBLESOME RIGHT": THE "LAW" IN DWORKIN'S
TREATMENT OF LAW AND RELIGION
PAUL HORWITZ*
INTRODUCTION
Ronald Dworkin's final book, Religion Without God, is a gloriously
compact treatment of a massive subject. Perhaps the massive subject. Its first
sentence is, "The theme of this book is that religion is deeper than God."' The
last chapter is titled "Death and Immortality." 2 This is, in short, a book about
eternity and the human condition. These are not small subjects, and Dworkin
deals with them grandly. It is an extraordinary last testament.
I have discussed Dworkin's treatment of these larger issues elsewhere.
3
Other contributors here deal with them as well. My focus here is much more
mundane. In one brief chapter, Dworkin descends from the empyrean, more or
less, to examine the law of religious freedom.4 My goal here is to assess
critically the accuracy and persuasiveness of that chapter.
Without rehashing an old debate or sharing too many cherished lines from
that debate, one can acknowledge that Dworkin received many sharp criticisms
for his jurisprudential approach in general and his treatment of individual cases
and doctrines in particular. His modus operandi, wrote one of his more vocal
critics, was to "argue[] baldly that constitutional law is and should be a
department of applied moral philosophy." 5 That approach was "too abstract for
a case-based legal system" like ours.6 Beyond the philosophizing, there was
"little texture to Dworkin's analysis of legal issues."'7 His writings showed
"little interest in the words of the Constitution, or in its structure... , or in any
* Gordon Rosen Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law.
RONALD DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD 1 (2013).
2 Id. at 149.
3 See Paul Horwitz, Dworkin's Jisei, COMMONWEAL, Feb. 7, 2014, at 26 [hereinafter
Horwitz, Dworkin's Jisei]; Paul Horwitz, The Sublime Dworkin, JOTWELL (July 23, 2013)
[hereinafter Horwitz, Sublime Dworkin], http://conlaw'jotwell.com/the-sublime-dworkin,
archived at http://perma.cc/AXT7-WXJV (reviewing Ronald Dworkin, Religion Without
God, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Apr. 4, 2013, at 67).
4 See DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 105-47.
Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARv. L. REv. 1314, 1321-22
(2002).
6 Richard A. Posner, Conceptions of Legal "Theory": A Response to Ronald Dworkin,
29 ARiz. ST. L.J. 377, 387 (1997).
7 Id. at 380-81.
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extended body of case law, let alone in the details of particular cases. His
implicit legal universe consist[ed] of a handful of general principles embodied
in a handful of exemplary, often rather bodiless, cases.
' 8
All quite right, in my view. This is not to deny that he was one of the most
eminent and important legal philosophers of his time. So he was, a point on
which even his critics agree.9 I dare say that outside certain nonlegal circles,
his views on constitutional legal issues grew less relevant to current debates.' 0
That is eventually true for all of us, if we are very lucky. But, as Religion
Without God shows, to the end (and after), Dworkin continued to write in a
clear and illuminating fashion on broad issues involving current concerns, not
to mention eternal ones. On the details of the law and even the broad outcomes
of cases, however, he was a less reliable or convincing guide. Or so I will
argue here.
Let me first give Dworkin his due, however.1 The problem the chapter
centers on - whether there is a principled "justification for offering religion a
right to special protection that is exclusive to theistic religions,"' 2 and if not,
what the scope and nature of "freedom of religion" should look like - has
consumed a great deal of attention recently. It figures heavily in contemporary
freedom-of-religion scholarship. 13 And it has played a significant role,
sometimes explicitly but more often implicitly, in recent statutory and
constitutional church-state cases as well. 14 Dworkin's treatment of this
8 Richard A. Posner, Legal Reasoning from the Top Down and from the Bottom Up: The
Question of Unenumerated Constitutional Rights, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 433, 435 (1992).
9 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Reply to Critics of The Problematics of Moral and Legal
Theory, 111 HARV. L, REv. 1796, 1796 (1998) (calling Dworkin "the leading scholar of
jurisprudence in the English-speaking world").
10 See Horwitz, Sublime Dworkin, supra note 3 ("[Dworkin's] loss was of less moment,
perhaps, to current work in constitutional law and theory. Dworkin's missiles against the
current Supreme Court, which continued to land in the pages of the New York Review of
Books, were more than merely transatlantic missiles; they seemed to have been launched
from another time and place altogether.").
1 On that score, I must point out that the quote I use in the title of this piece - "a
troublesome right" - is in fact incomplete. Dworkin proposes in Religion Without God that
we treat freedom of religion as a part of a "general right to ethical independence" rather than
as a "troublesome special right" involving a "high hurdle of protection and therefore [a]
compelling need for strict limits and careful definition." DwoRKIN, supra note 1, at 132-33.
The elision is of little importance as far as the title is concerned. But I would not want
Dworkin's argument to be misunderstood.
12 Id. at 117.
13 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Why Protect Religious Freedom?, 123 YALE L.J.
770 (2013) (reviewing BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2013)); Micah
Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2012).
14 In the Supreme Court's recent ministerial exception case, for instance, the Government
took a position similar to Dworkin's here, arguing that while religious institutions might
invoke freedom of association against particular applications of federal employment
1226 [Vol. 94:1225
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problem, which is driven by his argument in the first part of the book that a
"belief in a god is only one possible manifestation or consequence of [a]
deeper worldview" that we could call "religious,"'15 is interesting and
provocative.
Dworkin's legal conclusions are admittedly hard to disentangle from the
broader tapestry of argument he offers in Religion Without God. Some may
find this a virtue and a necessary consequence of the insistence in his last
books on the "unity of value,"'16 under which, as one critic describes it, "all of
our evaluative commitments have to finally cohere ... not just morality, but
also politics, law, aesthetics, prudence, . . . you name it."'17 Others may
consider it a shortcoming, one that impairs its usefulness for law and legal
doctrine.
Again, one must be fair. In his "Religious Freedom" chapter, Dworkin
examines how his view that we should "adopt[] a conception of religion that is
deeper than theism" plays out "as a matter of political morality as well as
philosophical depth,"'18 not as a humdrum, if difficult, question for non-
Herculean lawyers and judges. Given his unified theoretical approach,
however, his approach must perforce play out either completely or not at all.
Those who are not convinced by the unity of value, by his broader thoughts on
nontheistic religion, or by his broader argument that religious freedom should
be principled rather than historically, textually, or pragmatically based, 19 will
find it hard to draw any useful piecemeal advice from Dworkin's book.
Dworkin's greatness rested in his talents at the wholesale level, not in offering
retail goods. Those who are not inclined to buy his wares in bulk will go home
with empty hands.
20
discrimination laws, there was "no need-and no basis-for a special rule for ministers
grounded in the Religion Clauses themselves." Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012). The Court unanimously rejected this
position, calling it "untenable," "remarkable," and "hard to square with the text of the First
Amendment itself, which gives special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations."
Id. The case thus suggested that religion is "special" as a textual matter. But it did not and
could not resolve the question whether it is special as a principled matter, or of what
constitutes "religion," a "religious" claim, or a "minister" in the first place.
"5 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 1.
16 RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 1 (2011).
17 Don Herzog, Cute Prickly Critter with Presbyopia, 110 MICH. L. REv. 953, 959 (2012)
(reviewing DWORKIN, supra note 16). "Presbyopia," you will be happy to learn, "is a
condition in which[, with age,] the lens of the eye loses its ability to focus, making it
difficult to see objects up close." Presbyopia, MEDLINEPLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/med
lineplus/ency/article/001026.htm (last updated June 2, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/
LD8K-SD7G.
18 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 109. I would have thought "breadth" or "scope" would be
the ight word here, not "depth."
"9 See, e.g., id. at 109-16.
20 Cf Edward B. Foley, Requiem for Hercules, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 463, 478 (2001)
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I. DwoRKtN's DEMOTION OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
There is one broad exception to this, and it will serve as a vehicle for briefly
summarizing Dworkin's argument before moving to some of the specifics of
his legal discussion. The question he asks is simple enough. Constitutional
provisions guaranteeing religious freedom are often taken to involve some
form of theism. "Should this fact of common understanding be decisive in
determining who is entitled to the protection the various documents declare?" 2'
His answer, unsurprisingly to those who are at all familiar with his work,22 is
"no." Arguments from text, history, and policy are "inadequate to justify a
basic [constitutional] right."'2 3 We must find a principled "justification for
offering religion a right to special protection that is exclusive to theistic
religions" 24 - one that does not make the law "silly or arbitrary"2 5 and that
treats freedom of religion as "a human right, not just a useful legal
construction. '26 In Dworkin's view, it is difficult, if not impossible, to provide
a principled basis for confining such a right to theistic religion.
27
The alternative is to "expand that right's scope to reflect a better
justification. '28 We might thus "declare that people have a right in principle to
the free exercise of their profound convictions about life and its
responsibilities, whether derived from a belief in god or not, and that
government must stand neutral in policy and expenditure toward all such
convictions. '2 9 But, he rightly observes, "no community could possibly accept
that extended right."'30 It would quickly run into insuperable problems: "Once
we break the connection between a religious conviction and orthodox theism,
(reviewing RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
EQUALITY (2000)) (arguing, in light of the author's own experience as a government
litigator, that normative constitutional law scholarship should be less Herculean and more
incrementalist and evidence based, and concluding, "[W]e cannot expect answers on Big
Questions, and so [we] necessarily must search for answers to smaller ones").
21 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 108.
22 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1-38 (1996); Michael C. Dorf, Truth, Justice, and the American
Constitution, 97 COLut. L. REV. 133, 134-35, 138 (1997) (reviewing DWORKIN, supra;
DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW & TRUTH (1996)).
23 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 111.
24 Id. at 117.
25 Id. at 109.
26 Id. at 111. Those who question whether there is any difference between the two will
have gotten off the bus long before.
27 See id. at 110-16.





we seem to have no firm way of excluding even the wildest ethical eccentricity
from the category of protected faith."
'31
Moreover, once we add in the nonestablishment rule, we run into further
tensions. For Dworkin, nonestablishment means that "government must stand
neutral in policy and expenditure toward all such convictions. '32 And "an
exemption for one faith from a constraint imposed on people of other faiths
discriminates against those other faiths on religious grounds. '33 This is a
difficult gauntlet to run. In the end, "the constitutional requirement that
government not choose defeats itself.
' 34
I must depart from the role of impartial summarizer for a moment. If
Dworkin is right in his description of the nonestablishment norm, it can only be
as a matter of principle. As a matter of practice - one that some think can be
justified as a decent marriage between high principle and local (that is,
American) history and culture35 - it is far from clear that either of the Religion
Clauses demand this kind of rigid neutrality. Nor should we accept Dworkin's
assumptions about what "discrimination" entails uncritically.36 Dworkin's
concerns that requiring the government "not [to] choose among religions"
37
leads to incoherence are real ones.38 But it should be noted that some of the
tensions that Dworkin exploits here to undermine a "special right" 39 to
religious freedom are, if not of his own making, then at least a product of his
own largely undefended definitions.40 We should certainly not accept them
uncritically as statements of law.
3' Id. at 124.
32 Id. at 117.
" Id. at 125.
34 Id. at 128.
35 See generally PAUL HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE: LAW, RELIGION, AND THE
CONSTITUTION (2011); ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS
NEUTRALITY (2013).
36 See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Religious Freedom and the Nondiscrimination Norm, in
LEGAL RESPONSES TO RELIGIOUS PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES: ACCOMMODATION AND
ITS LIMITS 194 (Austin Sarat ed., 2012).
37 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 128.
31 See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, The Troublesome Religious Roots of Religious
Neutrality, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 865, 885 (2009); Steven D. Smith, Barnette's Big
Blunder, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 625, 645-47 (2003). Like Koppelman, I think this concern is
real but less troubling in practice than in principle. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 35, at
193.
39 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 133.
40 Cf Andrew B. Coan, The Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional Interpretation,
158 U. PA. L. REv. 1025, 1077-83 (2010) (discussing the method of argument by
"persuasive definitions" (citing Charles Leslie Stevenson, Persuasive Definitions, 47 MIND
331, 331 (1938))); Posner, supra note 6, at 379 (accusing Dworkin of engaging in
"persuasive definition with a vengeance" elsewhere in his work).
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Nevertheless, there are pieces of this argument that are important and useful
whether one accepts all of Dworkin's general principles or not. As I said, there
are concerns about the viability of a workable principle of freedom of religion
under a strict regime of government neutrality. We may reasonably doubt that
this is what American law requires in practice, occasional broad statements by
the Supreme Court notwithstanding. 41 But we cannot deny that the question of
neutrality has bedeviled church-state law for a long time. Dworkin's arguments
concerning the problems with limiting freedom of religion to theistic faith also
describe a genuine dilemma for freedom-of-religion jurisprudence. Neither of
these insights are new. Both have been dealt with better and in more detail by
others.42 But they are presented neatly here.
Let us stipulate that Dworkin has presented a real problem with freedom of
religion. If such a freedom is limited to theistic faiths, it excludes too much. If
it is expanded beyond that scope, it is unworkable and self-contradicting. What
is his answer to this dilemma?
In a word, it is to demote religious freedom. Freedom of "religion," now
broadly defined, should be treated as "a very general right to what we might
call 'ethical independence,"' under which the "government must never restrict
freedom just because it assumes that one way for people to live their lives...
is intrinsically better than another. '43 The government, however, may limit that
right for many other reasons, such as "to protect other people from harm ....
or to protect natural wonders, or to improve the general welfare."44 It should
not be treated as a "special right" that the government may not infringe absent
a compelling interest. 45 It should be treated, in short, as an equality rule for
"religion," capable of some creative application to be sure, but nothing more. 46
Any "religious" claims against government action may be overcome by a
"neutral . . . justification for any constraint. '47 No compelling interest is
needed.
41 See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968) ("Government in our
democracy, state and national, must be neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and
practice.").
42 See, e.g., supra note 13 and accompanying text.
43 DwoR~xrN, supra note 1, at 129-30.
44 Id. at 130-31.
45 Id. at 131. It is not entirely clear how this would translate into the usual doctrinal
language of standards of review. It would seem that Dworkin would submit such claims to a
form of rational basis review, albeit one in which certain reasons are treated as illegitimate
justifications for a law. See id. at 131-34. But the point is not entirely clear. Cf Frank I.
Michelman, Foxy Freedom?, 90 B.U. L. REV. 949, 961-72 (2010) (reviewing DwoRKIN,
supra note 16) (asking how Dworkin's theory of ethical independence would cash out in
terms of the American doctrine of tiers of scrutiny, and wondering "whether, in view of the
apparent entailments for legal doctrine, the value of respect for ethical responsibility can
plausibly be said to exhaust what 'liberty' stands for in one particular liberal culture").




What we appear to have, in short, is the rule in Employment Division v.
Smith.48 To that, however, we must add two additional limitations. First,
Dworkin offers a tricky - not arbitrary, surely, but certainly difficult to
navigate - description of those reasons that will satisfy his conditions for
rational justification of a law that infringes on the general right of ethical
independence. The government cannot infringe that right simply because it
believes that people who act one way and not another "are better people." 49 For
example, the government "may not" - he means must not - "forbid logging just
because it thinks that people who do not value great forests are despicable.
'50
But other reasons, ostensibly not tied to condemnation of independent ethical
choices, are fine - the government "may protect forests because forests are in
fact wonderful[,] even though none of its citizens thinks a life [spent]
wandering among them has any value. '51 This distinction would not, one
suspects, have been much consolation to the plaintiffs in Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass 'n.
52
Second, Smith permitted legislative accommodation of religion. 53 As a
matter of political morality, at least, Dworkin would impose additional
constraints. 54 Congress's decision to reverse the result in Smith through the
passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 55 (RFRA) was a mistake -
not just because RFRA was overbroad, or discriminated in favor of religion,
56
but because Congress was wrong on the facts. "The general right [of ethical
independence] does not protect the use of a banned hallucinogenic drug when
48 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (holding that Free Exercise claims for accommodation from
laws that burden religion must yield where a law is neutral and generally applicable).
49 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 130.
50 Id. (emphasis added).
51 Id. at 131.
52 485 U.S. 439, 456-58 (1989) (rejecting a Free Exercise claim challenging a
government decision to permit timber harvesting and road construction in an area of
national forest traditionally used for religious purposes by members of three Native
American tribes, who asserted that this use of the lands would effectively destroy their
ability to practice their religion altogether).
5 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
4 See DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 134-35.
55 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012)), invalidated in part by City of Boerne
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
56 That, however, is a part of Dworkin's calculus. See DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 135 ("If
the Native American Church is entitled to an exemption from drug-control laws, then
[followers of Aldous Huxley, who wrote of the benefits of taking mescaline,] would also be
entitled to an exemption, and skeptical hippies would be entitled to denounce the entire
drug-control regime as a religious establishment."). Others share the view that legislative
accommodations for religion should not discriminate, without believing that it would be
wrong to accommodate the peyote use at issue in Smith. But Dworkin's disagreement with
RFRA, as we have seen, does not appear to rest on nondiscrimination grounds alone.
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that use threatens general damage to the community. '57 Thus, "the Court [in
Smith] was wrong as a matter of political morality and Congress wrong. '58 The
government may engage in some accommodation, provided it is sufficiently
broad.59 In general, however, the "priority of nondiscriminatory collective
government over private religious exercise seems inevitable and right."60 So
what we really have, once Dworkin is done, is Smith without legislative
accommodation.
II. EVALUATING DWORKIN'S DEMOTION PROPOSAL
Dworkin calls his proposal "radical." Referring to his position that "rational,
nondiscriminatory laws" may require churches to "restrict their practices," he
asks his readers, "Do you find that shocking?" 61 This is a rhetorical question,
of course. An author who uses it, like an amusement park that calls its most
popular ride the "Deathtrap," seeks to intrigue and attract, not to repel.
In any event, Dworkin's position is not especially shocking. In the
ministerial exception case, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church &
School v. EEOC, the Government argued, as one article has summarized it,
"not only that the ministerial exception is not rooted in the religion clauses at
all, but that the religion clauses provide no additional protection to religious
institutions from antidiscrimination laws beyond those already afforded by the
Court's expressive-association cases."'62 Other amici, representing a host of law
professors, some of them law and religion scholars, similarly argued that the
case should be dealt with under the rubrics of freedom of association or
freedom of speech, not through the Religion Clauses, while making clear that
any such associational claims must show a close connection to expression. 6
3
As already discussed, some strong arguments have been made that, as a matter
of principle (but not necessarily as a matter of constitutional text or actual
practice),64 there is no good reason to treat religion as "special" for
57 Id.
58 Id
59 See id at 136.
60 Id. at 137.
61 Id at 129, 136.
62 Richard W. Garnett & John M. Robinson, Hosanna-Tabor, Religious Freedom, and the
Constitutional Structure, 2012 CATO SuP. CT. REv. 307, 319 (citing Brief for the Federal
Respondent, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694
(2012) (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 3319555).
63 See Brief of Amici Curiae Law and Religion Professors in Support of Respondents,
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 3532698. We take our cases as we
find them when working as advocates, of course. But it is worth noting that the primary case
relied upon by the amici and others as proof that churches might be entitled to some
protection, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), is one many of them have
roundly condemned elsewhere.
6 See, e.g., Schwartzman, supra note 13, at 1426 ("As a legal matter, however, we
[Vol. 94:12251232
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constitutional purposes.65 Some have seen in the rise of such arguments a trend
toward radical "secular egalitarianism" that threatens religious freedom as we
know it.66 Others, somewhat less apocalyptically, still argue that "[f]or the first
time in nearly 300 years, important forces in American society are questioning
the free exercise of religion in principle-suggesting that free exercise of
religion may be a bad idea, or at least, a right to be minimized. ' 67 His position
is increasingly popular - certainly enough so that it has lost the power to
shock.
But is this position right or wrong? Its accuracy and persuasiveness rest
substantially on three things: its statements about current law, the initial moves
by which Dworkin clears the ground for it, and its applications. All three are
weak. That does not necessarily make Dworkin's position wrong. But it
certainly undercuts the power of his argument.
The first element, the accuracy of his statements about current law, is the
least important. It is striking how little presence actual cases have in the
chapter. But this is, after all, an argument for an ideal, principled version of
religious freedom. Still, sparse though his treatment of the cases may be,
careful and accurate description of those cases would have strengthened
Dworkin's credibility, and eased concerns that a "moral reading" 68 of the
Religion Clauses, or of any other portion of the Constitution, is too far afield
from actual legal practice to be of much use to lawyers and judges - that the
devil is in the lack of details.
Take Dworkin's brief mention of Torcaso v. Watkins.69 Dworkin says that
"[i]n its Torcaso decision, the Supreme Court listed, among religions meeting
the test it had in mind, humanistic societies that are explicitly atheistic. '70 The
statement is accurate; to Dworkin's credit, he emphasizes that the Court in this
footnote statement was referring to humanist societies, not to secular
humanism in general, a point that often escapes notice.
71
cannot ignore the constitutional text we have inherited. And so the idea that religion must be
special is unavoidable. The text simply makes it so. But when we confront the moral
question-'Is religion special?'-the answer is far more difficult.").
65 See supra notes 24-40 and accompanying text.
66 See generally STEVEN D. SMITH, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM (2014).
67 Douglas Laycock, Sex, Atheism, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 88 U. DET. MERCY
L. REV. 407, 407 (2011).
68 See generally DWORKIN, supra note 22.
69 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
70 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 123 (referencing the Court's decision in Torcaso, 367 U.S.
at 495 n. 11, where the Court recognized several "religions in this country which do not
teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God," such as
"Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others").
71 See Eduardo M. Pefialver, Note, The Concept of Religion, 107 YALE L.J. 791, 797 n.37
(1997).
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But it is unlikely that the Supreme Court believed then, let alone now, that
secular humanism or any other "nontheistic conviction[]" 72 constitutes religion
for all purposes in the Religion Clauses.73 In striking down a state oath law that
barred atheists from serving in public office, the Court emphasized that the
government cannot impose requirements that "aid all religions as against non-
believers," or "aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as
against those religions founded on different beliefs. '74 This statement was
grounded in the Establishment Clause and its rule of nondiscrimination. It did
not treat "humanist societies," let alone "humanist" beliefs, as the equivalent of
religion for all purposes, especially under the Free Exercise Clause. Nor is it
necessary to do so for all Establishment Clause purposes. What is important is
that the government is barred from teaching "propositions about religion,"
whether positive or negative, and "whether or not [the] adherents of the
negative views ... could be said to practice a religion. '75 Dworkin's quote is
accurate enough. But in the context of his book, he encourages a broader
reading of Torcaso and the surrounding doctrine than the case requires. In
general, we should be cautious about his use of actual law.
So much for that. What about the foundational pieces of Dworkin's
argument - the criteria he sets in place for a proper approach to religious
freedom, and the criticisms he makes of alternatives to his proposed demotion
of religious freedom, without which that demotion would be less necessary and
thus less persuasive? Although he scores some important points and makes his
argument eloquently, there is reason for skepticism about this argument, too.
Part of the problem here is his penchant for argument by persuasive
definition. Recall that he begins by setting the following condition: "We must
reject any account of the nature or scope of religion that would make a distinct
right to religious freedom silly or arbitrary. '76 He argues that this is best
accomplished "by adopting a conception of religion that is deeper than
theism," 77 by which he evidently means "broader," not "deeper." Because it
becomes more difficult to avoid absurd results under a definition of freedom of
religion that is both highly protective and highly capacious in scope, this
criterion ends up buttressing his case for demoting freedom of religion
altogether.
72 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 123.
" See, e.g., Richard M. Esenberg, Must God Be Dead or Irrelevant: Drawing a Circle
That Lets Me in, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1, 31 & nn.207-10 (2009) (collecting lower
court cases rejecting "allegations of an 'establishment' of secularism").
" Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495.
75 Kent Greenawalt, Teaching About Religion in the Public Schools, 18 J.L. & POL. 329,
337 (2002) (emphasis added) (citing Kent Greenawalt, Diverse Perspectives and the
Religion Clauses: An Examination ofJustifications and Qualifying Beliefs, 74 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 1433, 1456-73 (1999)); see also HORWITZ, supra note 35, at 223-74.




There are good reasons to adopt a capacious understanding of "religion" and
"religious freedom," and they do lead to concerns about the resulting regime.
But we might notice two things about Dworkin's move here. The first is his
elision of "religion" and "religious freedom." What constitutes "religion" is a
question for scholars of religion. What constitutes "religious freedom" is a
legal question. How broadly or narrowly we define religion when considering
that question will depend on considerations quite distinct from those that
concern religion scholars. If our definition results in judicial underenforcement
relative to the full universe of potentially "religious" beliefs, that will hardly be
unusual for law, which practices the art of the possible. 78 As it turns out,
despite the broader conceptual questions raised by this issue, courts do not
seem to have too much practical difficulty dealing with definition-of-religion
questions sensibly.79 The real question will be whether there are good reasons
to limit the scope of "religion" within the legal practice of 'freedom of
religion."
That is the second thing to notice about Dworkin's move. One would have
thought that a broad range of justifications for the basic contours of modem
freedom of religion jurisprudence - in particular, its desire to provide
meaningful protection for religion and, consequently, to limit the scope of
beliefs or practices to which that protection applies - would satisfy the
requirement that those justifications not be "silly or arbitrary. '80 Outside the
veil of ignorance, one might suppose that text and history alone would suffice
as adequate justifications. Dworkin acknowledges that history has its claims
here.8' But he concludes that neither history nor "policy arguments about the
need for peace" are enough "to justify a basic right. 82 This rejection allows
him to set off on the road of abstractions of "political morality" and
"philosophical depth," 83 defining freedom of religion so broadly that his
ultimate proposal to demote religious freedom becomes a foregone conclusion.
We hardly need to travel all the way down that road. Indeed, beyond a bare
minimum of theorization, we need not travel more than a few steps. An
approach to freedom of religion - to its scope and limits - that starts with text,
history, and a few basic principles will indeed raise questions of consistency,
78 Cf Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1212 (1978) (discussing and defending judicial
underenforcement of constitutional norms); Richard C. Schragger, The Relative Irrelevance
of the Establishment Clause, 89 TEx. L. REv. 583 (2011) (applying this concept to the law
of the Establishment Clause).
79 See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Religious Establishment and Autonomy, 25 CONST.
CoMMENT. 291, 294 n. 12 (2008).
80 DwoRKrN, supra note 1, at 109.
"' Seeid. at 110-11.
82 Id. at 111.
83 Id. at 109.
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coherence, and imperfect application. But it will be far from "silly or
arbitrary," by any reasonable definition of that term.
84
In this short space I cannot address all the other problems with Dworkin's
foundational arguments. In any event, though I have attempted above to offer
an impartial description of those arguments and not a critical one, for many
readers description will be tantamount to criticism. It is perhaps best to say
simply that, as we have just seen, many of those arguments build on sweeping
assertions that we need not accept as uncontroversial. We need not accept
uncritically the notion that "the interpretation of basic constitutional concepts"
demands a deep level of attention to "matter[s] of political morality as well as
philosophical depth. '85 Knowing that religious voluntariness is a major part of
post-Reformation Western thought, we need not accept that freedom to
worship the god of one's choice is "over-inclusive" because "tolerating atheists
can lead only to a god's anger."
86
Nor, despite the fact that he raises a genuine issue here, need we accept all
the struts supporting Dworkin's argument that religious freedom doctrine as it
stands is fatally self-contradictory. 87 Dworkin is an elegant writer. It sounds
plausible enough to say about religious accommodations that "an exemption
for one faith from a constraint imposed on people of other faiths discriminates
against those other faiths on religious grounds. '88 If you believe this, then there
is indeed a problem of contradiction.
The problem is less grave, however, if we do not apply this general principle
in an absurd manner. Even if we extend a right to use hallucinogenic drugs to
anyone who has a strong religious or quasi-religious conviction about its use,
does that really discriminate "on religious grounds[] against those who only
want to get high"? 89 Is it really fatally self-contradictory to teach evolution,
while not teaching creationism, because evolution is consistent with a religious
84 Similarly, Dworkin argues, with good reason, that an extension of freedom of religion
to include any "profound convictions" will be untenable. Id. at 117. But he offers as his first
example the problems that would result from providing strict protection for the "religious"
freedom of "those many people who in the popular phrase 'worship' Mammon," treating
material success as a goal of "transcendent importance." Id. I do not wish to belittle his
broader point here, but the example is silly and a useful reminder of how little we should
rely on turns of phrase in developing serious arguments. "Serious worshipper[s] of
Mammon," id. at 120, if they exist (I have not met any who meet his description), do not
present genuine difficulties of application that would justify adopting a prescription - the
demotion of religious freedom to an easily overcome idea of "ethical independence" - that
Dworkin himself calls "radical." Id. at 129. This may just be one area in which judges
manage things better than philosophers.
85 Id. at 108-09.
86 Id. at 112 (emphasis added).
87 See id. at 124-28.
8 Id. at 125.
89 See id. at 126.
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view that God does not exist?90 The difference between the plaintiffs in the
first hypothetical may turn on the substantiality of the burden involved, and
treating different burdens differently is not discriminatory. In the second case,
teaching evolution as a dominant explanatory theory in biology is sensible in
itself, and does not require the teacher to "proceed to atheist or theist
conclusions." 91 The existence of genuine conceptual problems here92 does not
require us to undo the good along with the bad, any more than we are required
to demote the Speech Clause because free speech law "discriminates" in favor
of political speech and against criminal conspiracies.
I have suggested so far that the problems Dworkin raises concerning the law
of freedom of religion are genuine, but that the gloss of abstraction in his
argument overstates these problems and gives an undue air of inevitability to
his demotion proposal. If his demotion proposal were a good one in itself, good
enough to make the transition costs worthwhile, we might still be willing to
accept the proposal. With suitable reservation, Dworkin suggests that it is. Of
the broader subject of his book, he writes, "If we can separate God from
religion," we might be able to lower the heat of, or even eliminate, the ongoing
culture wars that embroil religion and politics. 93 Conceding that the ambition is
"utopian," he adds, "But a little philosophy might help."'94 Similarly, he
suggests in his chapter on the law of religious freedom that "the general right
to ethical independence give[s] us the protection that, on reflection, we believe
we need," 95 and that his approach can satisfactorily and persuasively address
the church-state legal issues raised by the culture wars.96 He observes that this
is probably "too much to hope." 97 But he intimates that his approach is not
only required as a matter of political morality, but potentially capable of
persuading others, including average citizens and not philosophers, on both
sides of the culture wars.
It is not. None of the conclusions he lays down, thoughtfully but imperially,
is strongly or clearly compelled by his general principles. And none of the
90 See id. at 126-28.
91 Kent Greenawalt, Establishing Religious Ideas: Evolution, Creationism, and
Intelligent Design, 17 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PuB. POL'y 321, 388 (2003). Dworkin
allows as much later in the book. See DwoRKIN, supra note 1, at 143-44.
92 See, e.g., HORwrrz, supra note 35, at 223-74.
93 DwORKIN, supra note 1, at 9.
94 Id. at 10.
95 Id. at 133.
96 See id. at 137 (proposing to "put our new hypothesis-that the general right to ethical
independence gives religion all the protection appropriate-to a more concrete test by
considering the heated controversies of [the culture] wars in its light"); id. at 146-47
(suggesting, albeit somewhat unclearly, that the principles represented both by the book as a
whole and by his chapter on the law could bring a larger number of individuals together on
common ground).
97 Id. at 147.
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specific solutions he offers to various legal and political problems involving
religion would gain any purchase at all in the culture wars - not one.
Take a couple of examples. Dworkin suggests that it might be acceptable for
the government to finance "Catholic adoption agencies that do not accept
same-sex couples as candidates, on the same terms as financing agencies that
do, ... provided that enough of the latter are available so that neither babies
nor same-sex couples seeking a baby are injured. '98 He contrasts this with
Congress's decision to reverse the Supreme Court's specific decision in Smith
with respect to an accommodation for religious peyote users, which he says
was wrong because it "would put people at a serious risk that it is the purpose
of the law to avoid." 99
As an application of principle, this is questionable, at least once actual facts
and values on the ground are applied. Applying the same principles, many
people, and certainly those who are most attentive to and passionate about
these issues, would conclude that the first accommodation was harmful,
regardless of the numbers involved or the adequacy of the available
alternatives, because it would send a message of abridgement or disparagement
of "full and equal citizenship in a free society."' 00 Conversely, the argument
for a religious (however defined) exemption for peyote use is that the drug is
unpleasant enough and safe enough, and its use is rare enough, that such an
exemption would not "put people at a serious risk that it is the purpose of the
law to avoid."''° As a matter of principle, then, neither conclusion is compelled
by Dworkin's framework. As a matter of politics, the question is even more
dubious. Would any common ground be achieved in the culture wars by
refusing on principle to grant exemptions to a few in the case of peyote, while
drawing courts and legislatures alike into the most heated battleground of those
wars by accommodating a refusal to allow same-sex adoptions?
To take another example, it is not clear how one demonstrates that "[e]thical
independence does condemn official displays of the insignia of organized
religions on courthouse walls or public streets unless these have genuinely
98 Id at 136.
99 Id.
100 Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L. REv. 648, 650 (2013)
(citing Pleasant City Grove v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 482 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)); see also Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and
Law's Social Meanings, 97 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1343-45 (2011). These articles address same-
sex marriage, not adoption. I draw on them not to suggest that they have a particular view
on the latter question, but simply to suggest that it would not be hard to make an argument,
from within Dworkin's approach, that a significant harm is involved in funding adoption
agencies that refuse to accept same-sex couples as candidates.
101 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 136; see, e.g., Kristen A. Carpenter, Limiting Principles
and Empowering Practices in American Indian Religious Freedoms, 45 CONN. L. REv. 387,
474-77 (2012) (discussing the spread of such exemptions); Nelson Tebbe, Free Exercise
and the Problem of Symmetry, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 699, 715 (2005) ("[P]eyote is unpleasant to
use and therefore has not generated widespread popular demand.").
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been drained of all but ecumenical cultural significance."'10 2 That is more or
less how the law stands today. But it has not really eased the culture wars. On
the contrary, to say that a religious display has nothing more than "ecumenical
cultural significance" is itself a provocation in the culture wars. It leads the
combatants on one side to emphasize the continuing religious nature of the
display and their offense at it. And it moves the combatants on the other side to
proliferate the number of displays, 10 3 while insisting that the display is both
genuinely religious and a fundamental part of American culture, or describing
such displays as secular and ecumenical while offering the broadest possible
winks to their audience. The temperature has gone up, not down.
And another: Dworkin writes that "moment of silence" laws satisfy his
principle of "[e]thical independence . . . unless the legislative record displays
an intention specifically to benefit theistic religion." 10 4 Why is intent relevant
here? The ethically independent individual's decision how to use that moment
of silence is not affected by the legislature's own preference for prayer over
meditation.
Similarly, in considering the teaching of intelligent design in public schools,
why is it relevant that those who proposed the law "were acting not primarily
for purely academic motives" but in the spirit of what Dworkin calls "a
national campaign of the so-called religious right to increase the role of godly
religion in public life"? 10 5 Teaching intelligent design may well be
constitutionally problematic, but what contribution does legislative intent make
to Dworkin's evaluation? It is true that he believes that "[e]thical independence
... stops government from restricting freedom only for certain reasons and not
for others."'1 6 But that limitation applies, with some justification, to
government arguments defending infringements on individual choice. To the
extent that advocates of intelligent design propose that it be taught in addition
to standard evolutionary theory, can this example really be called a restriction
on freedom?
And so on. Again, my point is not that none of Dworkin's proposals make
sense, either under current approaches to religious freedom or under his
proposed rule of "ethical independence." I agree with some and disagree with
others. While they may be broadly consistent with his approach, however,
none of them are clearly compelled by it. If his goal is to ease contradictions in
current law and lend clarity and integrity to our treatment of freedom of
102 DwORKIN, supra note 1, at 138.
103 For example, the Alabama legislature recently debated a bill that would allow the
display of the Ten Commandments in public buildings. See Kyle Whitmire, Ten
Commandments Bill on Way to Alabama Senate After Passing out of Committee, AL (Feb.
27, 2014), http://blog.al.com/wire/2014/02/ten commandments-bill on way t.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/4A4G-PXQW.
104 DWORKiN, supra note 1, at 140.
105 Id. at 142-43.
106 id. at 131.
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religion, he falls short. And to the extent that he harbors a broader hope,
however faint, that his proposal might cool the culture wars, that hope is
obviously misplaced. "[A] little philosophy" 107 will not help.
CONCLUSION
All of this is a little harsh. It is certainly a far cry from "de mortuis nil nisi
bonum." As I have written elsewhere, there is much to admire in Religion
Without God 108 In its highest flights and most eloquent moments, and
especially in its evocation of a common human yearning after mystery and
wonder109 - a sense of the universe as "awe-inspiring and deserving of a kind
of emotional response that at least borders on trembling"'1 10 - Dworkin's final
book is a fine monument to the man and his life. We might best think of it that
way, treating the chapter on law and religion as a mere tangent. Given his
insistence on the unity and universality of value and its application to law,
however, I do not think Dworkin would have accepted such a partition. Call it,
then, a lovely but flawed monument.
107 Id. at 10.
108 See Horwitz, Dworkin 's Jisei, supra note 3.
09 See, e.g., DwoRKIN, supra note 1, at 1-4, 6, 11-12, 19-20.
110 Id. at 20.
1240 [Vol. 94:1225
